Xi Jinping met with South Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo at Hangzhou Xihu State Guest House on September 23rd during Han’s visit to China to attend the opening ceremony of the 19th Asian Games. Xi pointed out that “China and South Korea are immovable close neighbors and inseparable cooperative partners.” Xi’s emphasis reveals that the two sides are facing a contradictory situation of diplomatic contradictions and economic and trade cooperation. Moreover, confrontation and cooperation in China’s periphery have obvious differences in terms of class interests. Han noted that “in the face of numerous challenges in the current international community, maintaining high-level exchanges between South Korea and China is conducive to advancing the development of bilateral ties and collaborating to address these challenges.” Han also, in a highly symbolic gesture, invited Xi to visit South Korea on behalf of South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol. Later, according to a report by the Yonhap News Agency on September 24th, the South Korean Presidential Office announced on the same day that South Korea and China would start formal discussion about Xi’s visit to South Korea. However, even if Xi plans to visit South Korea, it will not change the constant existence of confrontation and cooperation in China’s periphery, which are impacting the security landscape in the Asia-Pacific region.
The General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and President of the State Affairs Commission of North Korea Kim Jong-un paid a state visit to Russia from September 12th to 17th and met with Russian President Vladimir Putin. This was Kim’s first foreign trip since the COVID-19 pandemic, and it had been four years since his last visit. Putin enthusiastically accepted Kim’s invitation to visit North Korea. The two sides touted their strategic cooperative relationship in their news reports and noted that their ties would have a deep impact on the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the situation on the Korean Peninsula and would accelerate the restructuring of global geopolitics. Not only did Russia and North Korea touch on the issue of aerospace cooperation during Kim’s visit, potential arms trade between the two countries may also influence international situations amid the Russia-Ukraine military conflict. Moreover, North Korea under Kim has accelerated the development of the defense industry since early 2021. Pyongyang also adopted a five-year defense development plan, including strategic nuclear missile submarine and other advanced weapons and equipment. China is undoubtedly more sensitive and alert to the evolving relationship between Russia and North Korea.
Chen Xiangyang, director of the Center for Korean Peninsula Studies of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations（CICIR）, published an article titled “Kim Jong-un’s Visit to Russia Brought Changes to Northeast Asia” on the CICIR website on September 13th. Chen’s article pointed out that the U.S. will face increasing difficulties as Russia and North Korea strengthens bilateral relations. The U.S. is already exhausted from providing military support to Ukraine and seeking reconciliation between Japan and South Korea. If the U.S. tries to double down its efforts on the above areas, it will further consume its strategic resources or even hurt its economic development and the basis of its global dominance. Closer ties between Russia and North Korea will also intensify camp confrontation in Northeast Asia. The U.S., Japan and South Korea held a summit at Camp David on August 18th. A trilateral quasi-alliance between the three countries is emerging. A quasi-alliance between Russia and North Korea will also be established if the two sides comprehensively promote military, economic and diplomatic cooperation. The possibility cannot be excluded that hotspot issues may suddenly spiral out of control if camp confrontation becomes a reality in Northeast Asia. The fact that the CICIR, a think tank operated by China’s Ministry of State Security, timely reflected such a changing situation fully demonstrates that the Chinese leadership is aware of China’s inevitable entanglement in the camp confrontation between the U.S.-Japan-South Korea and the Russia-North Korea quasi-alliances. Even if Xi plans to visit South Korea, there is no space for optimism regarding the future prospects of the Korean Peninsula.
In respect to looming strategic problems facing China, Chen’s article noted that “the increasingly acute camp confrontation will crowd out shared interests among stakeholders in Northeast Asia. It will become much more difficult to resume the denuclearization process on the Korean Peninsula and establish a security and peace mechanism in Northeast Asia. The international non-proliferation mechanism will be further called into question.” In his article, Chen also pointed out the preciousness of the concept of a community of shared future for mankind, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Development Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative in contrast to the above developments. A community of shared future for mankind and the three global initiatives are all important announcements to the international community by Xi Jinping. China’s State Council Information Office released a white paper titled “A Global Community of Shared Future: China’s Proposals and Actions” on September 27th. The white paper vows to implement the three global initiatives, which demonstrate China’s global visions and increasing international influence. However, the current situation will make it difficult for China to carry out the three global initiatives and cast a shadow over Xi’s plan to visit South Korea.
（Chiu-lung Huang, Adjunct Associate Professor of Department of Public Security of the Central Police University）
(Translated to English by Cindy Li)
