According to the 44th announcement of China’s General Administration of Customs released in May 2023, “it is approved that Russia’s port of Vladivostok will be added as a transit port for cross-border transportation of domestically-traded goods. Yongzhou Container Terminal in Zhoushan, Zhejiang and Zhapu Port in Jiaxing, Zhejiang will be added as entry ports for cross-border transportation of domestically-traded goods. The announcement will be effective since June 1st.”
Judging for the perspective of area of operation analysis, Vladivostok Port is 53.7 kilometers away from China’s Jilin Province with more than seventy special terminals and a capacity of berthing 100,000-ton vessels. The Golden Horn Bay, the inner harbor of Vladivostok, does not freeze in winter. The outer harbor Peter the Great Gulf freezes from December to March. But ice can be cleared by icebreaker ships. So the port is in fact operational throughout the year. Vladivostok Port is situated in the vast Sea of Japan. To its north, the Sea of Japan is connected with the Pacific Ocean through the Sea of Okhotsk. To its east, it is connected with the Pacific Ocean through the Tsugaru Strait (the shortest route from Vladivostok Port to the Pacific Ocean). To its south, it is connected with the Seto Inland Sea by the Kanmon Straits. The Korean Strait connects the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea and the Yellow Seas. Vladivostok is only over 700 kilometers away from Japan and home to the Russian Navy’s Pacific Fleet, posing a serious threat to Japan’s security. Thus Vladivostok Port has significant strategic value in military terms.
Russia and China have gradually improved their relations and engaged in comprehensive cooperation since 1990, especially in the military area. Russia sells various kinds of advanced weapons to China and conducts technology transfer. Russian and Chinese navies have regularly carried out joint maritime exercises from 2012. These have been expanded to include joint military exercises of army troops and joint strategic air patrols by the air force. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that Russia still has reservations about China and takes precautions. However, Russia’s national power has been seriously undermined due to the protracted war in Ukraine and sanctions imposed by the U.S. and European countries. Russia hopes to get help from China and thus changes its long-standing actions and mindset of keeping China at bay. Bilateral relations have been increasingly elevated. On the surface, Russia’s opening of Vladivostok Port to China as a transit port for China’s domestically-traded goods is economic and trade-oriented. However, it also hides the possibility of future military cooperation between the two sides.
As the People’s Liberation Army completed military reform, the PLA Navy and Air Force are increasingly catching up with the U.S. forces in terms of equipment performance. The PLA also continues to increase the number of military equipment. Its missions have transformed to mainly focus on “protecting the frontier of interests” with continuous projection of navy and air force forces. China is starting to establish a group of overseas bases to solve military logistics problems. China for a long time has made inroads into other countries by building ports, airports, railroads and other infrastructure, making them heavily indebted to China. Countries can only repay debts with mineral resources or give China access to their ports through long-term leases. According to incomplete statistics, using the BRI and state-owned enterprises such as China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), China has invested more than 100 strategic commercial ports and terminal networks and cunningly enabled or covered the PLA’s overseas military buildup or operations. China may renovate Vladivostok Port with excuses such as expansion after it becomes a transit port for China’s domestically-traded goods. It is highly possible that China and Russia will further increase military cooperation at Vladivostok Port and join hands to counter the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy as the two countries face containment and pressure from the U.S. and Japan’s military efforts in its southwestern islands.
In conclusion, Russia’s opening of Vladivostok Port to China as a transit port for China’s domestically-traded goods marks the beginning of bilateral cooperation. Chinese and Russian troops will continue to strengthen joint military exercises. Based on the past practice of the PLA, Chinese warships may use Vladivostok Port for logistical support and the Peter the Great Gulf as a venue for joint exercises. The regular presence of Chinese warships there will pose a direct threat to northern Japan. Moreover, Chinese H-6 bombers landed at Vladivostok during the fifth joint strategic air patrol. Russia’s Tu-95 strategic bombers landed in Hangzhou and Nanjing respectively during the fifth and sixth patrols, demonstrating that the two sides have reached an agreement to allow landing at the other’s airport and acquired the capability to provide logistical support. The PLA is also establishing intelligence gathering networks around the world. The newly revealed one is an electronic eavesdropping facility in Cuba. The Network Systems Department (NSD) under the PLA Strategic Support Force may establish spy bases at Vladivostok port to monitor Japan and South Korea to compliment the insufficiency of the NSD monitoring base in Qingdao. Military cooperation between Russia and China will become increasingly closer as Russia’s national power continues to diminish. China in the short term will still conceal military activities with commercial ones and will not blatantly use Vladivostok Port for military purposes. However, China may establish monitoring facilities and logistical support bases at the port and military presence in the Peter the Great Gulf in the long term to deter Japanese and South Korean forces and ensure the security of China, Russia and North Korea.
（Tai-yuan Yang, Contract Research Fellow of the Institute of Chinese Communist Studies ）
(Translated to English by Cindy Li)
