In conclusion, as US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo said prior to her visit to China, the purpose of the trip is to strike a difficult balance. Although the targeted issues include the US-China technology war, market access, bilateral trade, government communication, and the Chinese economic situation, the focus is on investment and trade. However, the most important result of the trip is to set up the right conditions and atmosphere for the meeting of the two leaders at the G20 summit in New Delhi, India in September, or even the “Biden-Xi meeting” at the APEC Leaders’ Meeting hosted by the US in November. Followed by what Raimondo said, to establish a channel for regular communication with the Chinese; and lastly, to help ease the tension between the two countries in the coming period of time.
In essence, Raimondo, the first US Secretary of Commerce to visit China in seven years, is echoing President Joe Biden’s statement that he does not seek to change China’s system, does not seek to start a cold war with China, does not seek to strengthen alliances against China, has no intention of seeking conflict with China, does not intend to break off ties with China, impede China’s economic development, or contain China. Raimondo’s visit to China is a continuation of the visits by high-ranking US officials such as Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen, and Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry since 2023, in a bid to strengthen economic and trade relations with China. Although the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the US Department of Commerce announced that 27 Chinese companies had been removed from the Unverified List on the eve of Raimondo’s China visit, there are still nearly 700 Chinese companies on BIS’s list of export-controlled entities; and Raimondo has made it clear that the US, in the interest of national security, not only has no intention of changing existing export control measures, but also will not negotiate on these issues, let alone make concessions. In fact, in November 2018, BIS released a report listing 14 emerging technologies that affect US security. On the eve of Raimondo’s China visit, Biden signed an executive order banning US companies and individuals from investing in China in three major areas, including semiconductors, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence.
In other words, although the CCP has repeatedly asked the US to reduce or even lift the ban on export controls, and allow US companies to invest in China, Raimondo’s refusal underscores the fact that there has been no fundamental change in the basic contradictions of the US-China relationship, especially the divergence of views on the wars of science and technology, and trade.
However, the CCP has not been left without any gains, and it can even be said that the three major results achieved by Raimondo are exactly what the Chinese is looking forward to, including the making of the right conditions for the Biden-Xi meeting, the establishment of a formalized communication channel with the US, and the easing of China-US relations; meanwhile, the extension of the Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement (STA) between the two countries (albeit for only six months) has prevented the further decoupling in science and technology between the two countries.
In the past, the US was willing to let China “hook up” and “hitch a ride” in the field of science and technology, mainly because the US has always been upholding technological internationalism, and also believes that its technological strength is far ahead of China. Therefore, allowing China to use its technological products and technologies is beneficial to the US economy on the one hand, and to maintain China’s technological dependence on the US on the other. However, as China’s technological strength increased, the US felt threatened and changed its course from technological internationalism to technological nationalism. In the face of US containment or decoupling in the field of science and technology, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will certainly deepen its economic and trade relations with the US, for example, by expanding market access, and expanding the import and purchase of goods and services, in exchange for the relaxation of US science and technology containment.
In light of this, Raimondo, who was invited to China, remains focused on pursuing US economic and trade interests, including the reinstatement of Boeing’s 737 MAX order, the lifting of bans on US firms such as Micron and Intel, as well as market access and “seeking a more predictable business environment in China” under the CCP’s anti-espionage law. For the CCP, easing ties with the US is in its interest, so it took the initiative to invite Raimondo to send a friendly message. However, the CCP believes that if the US doesn’t take concrete action to ease the tech wars, it will continue to impose measures on the US, such as rare-earth controls, and will therefore “watch what the US does” rather than “listen to what it says”. In a word, if the US does not change its strategic objectives and the US-China foundation of trust is weak, the current US-China relations are far from being “bedfellows” let alone “strange bedfellows.” It seems almost rhetorical to ask how long the friendly atmosphere would last after Raimondo’s visit to China.
(Huang Chien-chun, Director, Mainland China Affairs Division, Chinese National Federation of Industries)
(Translated to English by Chen Cheng-Yi)
