（ Huang, Chung Ting, Associate Research Fellow, Division of Chinese Politics, Military and Warfighting Concepts, Institute for National Defense and Security Research）
When China conducted a military exercise around Taiwan in August 2022, its Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying stated, “China’s departments concerned have issued safety alert and navigation warning in advance, and China’s actions are in accordance with international law and practice.” In this case, Beijing’s recent “Joint Sword-2024A” military exercise is contrary to the international law and practice.
Fujian Maritime Safety Administration (MSA), subordinate to China MSA, issued a navigation warning containing the latitude and longitude coordinates for the exercise area a day before the military exercise around Taiwan in 2022. But this time it didn’t bother to issue any navigation warning; instead, Dalian Maritime Safety Administration issued a navigation warning containing latitude and longitude coordinates for a small “military operation” in the southeast sea water of Dalian from May 24 to June 11, which happened to coincide with the exercise time of the Joint-Sword-2024A. Similarly, Qinglan MSA issued a prior navigation warning with latitude and longitude coordinates for a “military training” in a small area near Baian Island on the east of Hainan Island from the 26th to 28th. Since Beijing didn’t issue any navigation warning for the bigger Join Sword-2024A, it definitely wouldn’t and couldn’t conduct a live ammunition drill. Of Course, Beijing might want to create an air of mystery by withholding warning to raise tension.
In addition, the Joint Sword-2024A was first linked with maritime law enforcement operations. The sea areas for the operations mainly covered two of the four regions of Taiwan, that were designated as territorial sea basepoints by Beijing in 1996. These regions include Dongyin, Dongsha (Nanding), Wuqiu, and Dongding, among which China designated Dongyin and Wuqiu, located within Lienchiang County and Kinmen County and nearer to Taiwan, as targets for the “cognitive warfare for rights protection.” Beijing intended to declare sovereignty to the US, Japan, and other foreign countries by choosing territorial sea basepoints close to Taiwan, also sending a warning signal to Taiwan.
For the distance between the operational waters and the target islands, the vessels of China coast guard (CCG) kept a closest distance of 2.8 nautical miles (around 5.1 km) and 3.1 nautical miles (around 5.7 km) with Wuqiu and Dongyin, respectively. It seems even closer than the recent incident where CCG vessels intruded Kinmen’s waters (5.5 km on March 16; 7 km on May 3). The boundary of prohibited waters in the south of Kinmen is 8,000 meters while that of Dongyin and Wuqiu 4,000 meters. So the prior intruding into Kinmen’s waters occurred in prohibited waters whereas the recent CCG operation in restricted waters of 4,000 to 6,000 meters.
In terms of the concept and content of the exercises, their sensitivity varies. For routine activities around Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands waters, CCG claimed to engage in rights protection patrol in its territorial sea; for the presence of Filipinos around Huangyan Island (Scarborough Reef), CCG declared law enforcement of rights protection in its jurisdictional sea; for the routine patrols in Kinmen waters on May 3, CCG asserted security protection of its jurisdictional sea; however, for the recent activities in waters of Dongyin and Wuqiu, CCG proclaimed conducting a comprehensive drill that centered on humanitarian rescue.
In terms of the scope of the Joint Sword exercise, the five designated exercise zones did not extend to Taiwan’s territorial waters as they did in the 2022 exercise around Taiwan. They were generally along the limits or inner edges of adjacent areas to Taiwan main island, but the exercise zones, ranging from north to west, southwest, southeast, and east, included the no-flight zones (NFZ) of R-8, F-5, R-12, R-42 and R-17 around Taiwan. Among the exercise zones, the north, west, south and the east specifically targeted at Taipei, Taichung, Kaohsiung and Hualian cities marked in the PLA’s schematic diagram. Evidently, this exercise was of significance of coercive cognitive warfare.
Notably, the five exercise zones all crossed beyond the middle line of the Taiwan Strait. And, in this exercise, it seemed to reduce provocation toward Japan while intentionally demonstrating to the Philippines. This time, Japan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the southwest of Yaeyama Islands was not included in the east exercise zone of Taiwan as it did in 2022, but the current exercise area in the south of Taiwan has shifted southeastward, moving from the Bashi Channel toward the northeast and extending to an adjacent area of the Philippine Batanes Islands. This move was obviously to challenge intents of making the Batanes Islands the first island chain chokepoint and a tactical relay position for the US and the Philippines.
Furthermore, the exercise zones in southeast and west Taiwan seem to align with the ninth and tenth dashes of the “South Sea Dash Line,” indicating China’s intention to assert it sovereignty through delineating the boundaries of the two exercise zones.
（Translated to English by Tracy Chou）
