（Lucio Blanco Pitlo III； President, Philippine Association for Chinese Studies ；Research Fellow, Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation ）
The Philippines and China are caught in a series of untoward sea incidents that have affected their bilateral ties. As Manila invigorates its alliance with the United States and supports Washington’s broader deterrence strategy to check PRC’s growing power projection and capacity, pressure on the West Philippine Sea intensifies. In dealing with Beijing’s illegal, assertive, and disruptive activities in choppy waters, Manila employs a mix of legal, diplomatic, security, and communication tools. As a smaller country relative to its big northern neighbor, Manila adopts an asymmetric approach, leveraging moral and legal high ground, alliances, and partnerships.
The Philippines has been taking steps to ensure that its maritime claims conform with international law, notably the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, dubbed as the “constitution for the oceans,” and the 2016 South China Sea arbitration award. The latter nullified claims that are not in line with UNCLOS and maintained that none of the features in the Spratlys constitute an island eligible for extended maritime entitlements. The judgment invalidated China’s claims of historic rights over a huge expanse of the strategic semi-enclosed sea and barred attempts to claim exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf (CS) using the Spratlys as base points. The landmark ruling also said that low-tide elevations cannot be appropriated and belong to the coastal state in which territorial sea or EEZ they are located. The tribunal also ruled that China violated Philippines’ sovereign rights by interfering in the latter’s marine economic activities, notably efforts to harness offshore petroleum resources. Much of the country’s oil and gas bounty is found offshore west of Palawan, the nearest landmass to the Spratlys. The West Philippine Sea is also a rich traditional fishing ground for local Filipino fisherfolk residing in the country’s western seaboard, accounting for 15% of the national output and providing livelihood to 300,000 fishers.
Referring to his country’s actions, Philippine President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr., in the recent Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore, said that, “we have made a conscious effort to align our definition of our territory and our maritime zones with what international law permits and recognizes,” adding that the “the lines that we draw in our waters are not derived from just our imagination, but from international law.” He made a veiled reference to China’s illegitimate and expansive ten-dashed lines, saying that Manila’s efforts “stand in stark contrast to assertive actors who aim to propagate excessive and baseless claims through force, intimidation and deception.” Back when he was a senator, Marcos co-sponsored the Archipelagic Baselines Law, which set the basis of the country’s maritime jurisdiction. As president, he looks forward to signing the Maritime Zones Law to clarify the geographic extent of the country’s maritime domain. The Philippines is also considering filing another case against China for marine environment degradation.
Manila is rallying allies and partners to recognize and support the implementation of the 2016 award, which China continues to reject. The country considers it already as part of international law and as a legal and peaceful means of resolving disputes. It cites the award in its statements relative to the flashpoint and encourages its neighbors, ASEAN, and the rest of the international community to do the same. The idea is to garner as much international backing to coax Beijing into compliance, a tall order given China’s clout, especially among emerging and developing countries in the Global South. That said, 26 countries already called for the ruling to be honored, while 17 countries issued statements positively acknowledging the value of the historic award. Neighboring coastal states Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam are among the countries that recognized the award. Manila is also warming up with Hanoi, another forward leaning claimant, with both sides discussing a bilateral code of conduct given frustrations with the long-delayed ASEAN-China Code of Conduct (COC). During Marcos’ visit to Vietnam early this year, both sides signed a Memorandum of Understanding on maritime cooperation and incident prevention. Both countries also plan to set up a Joint Coast Guard Committee to tackle mutual concerns and a hotline communication channel. Philippines continue to lodge complaints against China fo its activities in the West Philippine Sea. As of May 2024, 159 diplomatic protests have been filed.
The Philippines also recently hosted ASEAN Coast Guard Forum in Samal City, Davao del Norte where a proposal to craft a common set of procedures for maritime law enforcement operations in the region’s waters was made. Dubbed the South East Asian Protocols on Engagements at Sea for ASEAN Coast Guards and Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies (SEA-PEACE), it aims to govern the conduct of various maritime law enforcement missions, including marine environment protection, search and rescue, and combatting seaborne transnational crimes like piracy, drug and human trafficking, illegal fishing and transport of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This is Manila’s contribution in responsibly shaping maritime norms.
Last year, the Philippines also adopted a transparency approach to expose China’s activities in the West Philippine Sea. It inserted local and foreign media in its routine patrols and resupply sorties to its administered outposts to document Chinese interference and intimidation. This puts a spotlight on China’s gray zone actions in the contested sea, including the employment of fishing or maritime militias for deniability. They are in the gray zone between war and peace as they are calculated moves to infringe upon and challenge Philippine position yet still below the threshold of armed attack to trigger conflict and alliance obligations under the Philippines-US Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). These include such tactics as swarming, dangerous maneuvers, collissions and use of water cannon. The Chinese Coast Guard have fired high-pressure water cannons against Philippine civilian supply ships, as well as Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) vessels, resulting to injuries to sailors and damage to property. Marcos expressed concern about these worrisome developments and maintained that the killing of a Filipino citizen by a willful act is near an act of war. Such strong remarks may inadvertently lower the bar for possible conflict.
In light of rising maritime tensions, Manila and Washington issued new defense guidelines, expanded US military access in four new agreed locations in the Philippines and stepped up joint military exercises. In this year’s Balikatan exercises, naval drills went beyond the country’s territorial sea into its EEZ, a first in the history of the annual defense activity. For the first time, France also joined this year’s iteration, making it a trilateral maritime exercise. It is also the first time that the PCG took part in the activity. Exercises also include coastal defense, island retaking, air and missile defense and sinking mock enemy ships. US rockets and missiles from HIMARS, Patriot, and, this year, Typhon were also deployed during the drills. Manila also welcomed the idea of combined sails with allies and partners in its EEZ. Such drills increased troop readiness and interoperability to work alongside allies and partners in responding to regional contingencies. The country is also negotiating a reciprocal access agreement with Japan and a visiting forces accord with France. Cooperation for maritime domain awareness, information sharing and transfer of assets also help the country’s maritime capacity building. The country is also working with allies and partners to enhance its cybersecurity and information warfare capability. The country continues to invest in its multiyear military and coast guard modernization program with plans to acquire submarines and multirole fighter aircraft.
Finally, Manila is also strengthening its cognitive resilience and fighting misleading narratives propagated to undermine its autonomy, its position in the flashpoint and its will to defend its maritime interests. Manila is challenging views that paint the South China Sea merely from the lens of US-China competition, denying the agency of other coastal states. This includes depiction of the country as a mere US proxy or pawn in its rivalry with China. Marcos, during his address before the Shangri-La forum said that: “We must reject unjust narratives that seek to subsume distinct national interest in a so-called major-country dynamic which seeks to impose a hierarchy amongst nations.” He encouraged regional countries to discard “misguided interpretations that paint our region as a mere theatre of geopolitical rivalries,” saying: “We are not mere bystanders to unfolding world events. We are the actors that drive those events. We are the main characters in our collective story. We are the owners of the narratives of our regional community. Thus, we reject any attempt to deny strategic agencies, especially by force, that seek to subordinate our interest to anyone else’s.” In relation to the arbitration award, the president argued that: “Amidst misleading narratives that seek to discredit international legal procedures, there is a need to reaffirm that those modalities are an expression of good faith. They are a service to the progressive development and codification of international law. They are never an unfriendly act.”
