(CHANG Ching, Research Fellow, Society for Strategic Studies R.O.C.)
Members of China Power Project under the US think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) issued a research report titled “How China Could Quarantine Taiwan: Mapping out Two Possible Scenarios” on June 5. The report was republished by medias but has not raised Beijing’s attention.
This research report is the first result of the team’s series research. In the end of the report, it specifically mentioned that the subsequent second report would be focused on the “blockade” measures taken by China against Taiwan. The research team clearly and deliberately stated in the beginning of the report “quarantine” as law enforcement actions led by law enforced agencies, with military force acting as supporting role. But “blockade” is an action led by military force, with cost guard and maritime militia acting as supporting role. Given the similarity of the two terms in essence, the term “quarantine” is interpreted as “quasi-blockade” in this article.
If we look back the history of the US, we will find that during the Cuba Missile Crisis from October 22 to November 20, 1962, the US undertook substantial marine blockade actions against Cuba, which was intentionally and openly declared as “quarantine,” in an attempt to avoid the responsibility of declaring war against Cuba under the international law. Also, with the consideration of gaining supports from member states of Organization of American States (OAS), a new term not existing in the international law was created deliberately to disguise US substantial military blockade against Cuba.
In recent years, the US think tanks and medias have loudly spoken up and repeatedly accused China of conducting operations in gray zones through its maritime law enforcement teams and marine militias. Therefore, the research teams of the CSIS influenced by this blind groupthink, in reflex responses, have applied US past actions of avoiding declaring war but engaging in substantial hostile actions to speculate Beijing’s military operations against Taiwan, which is totally unsurprised.
It must be noted that all the loud and continuous assertions about PLA’s preparations for gray zone operations by combining law enforcement vessels have never presented credible evidence or references to PLA’s guidelines to confirm Beijing’s such strategy toward Taiwan. In reality, the PLA has never published any such kind of advocacy of conducting gray zones operations in its military newspapers or journals. All the assertions about PLA or quasi-military units or forces employing such actions are mostly from the western medias and think tanks whose credibility worths deep consideration.
In addition, it has to stress that the term “quarantine” has never appeared in any clauses of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982. And the latest 1994 edition of San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, norms of maritime warfare, does not contain any such terms. In the relevant guidelines or military journals of the PLA, it has never mentioned or employed any similar terms like “quarantine” to take military actions against Taiwan or quasi-military actions to pose intimidation.
Finally, it must point out the most absurd blind point of thinking of the CSIS. In the two different scenarios it outlined, all the positioning and deployment of PLA, coast guard and maritime militias are primarily along the periphery of adjacent areas delineated by Taiwan, the Republic of China. It shows a total misunderstanding of Beijing’s basic political stance and PLA’s guideline for operations in the Taiwan Straits. The delineation of adjacent areas is based on territorial sea baseline, and only a sovereign state is able to delineate territorial sea baseline. If PLA deploys it forces based on the periphery of Taiwan’s adjacent areas, wouldn’t it indirectly recognize Taiwan’s sovereignty?
PLA never accepts the status of medium line of the Taiwan Strait, and neither does it recognize the existence of periphery of adjacent areas of 24 nautical miles away from territorial sea baseline. It demonstrates PLA’s stance when vessels of both sides confront around the peripheral waters of Taiwan and shout to each other. The CSIS believes that Beijing intends to highlight its sovereignty over Taiwan through law enforcement in the Taiwan Strait, particularly exercising jurisdiction over third-country vessels by its law enforcement agencies in waters around Taiwan. But the problem is why China’s maritime actions, and the positioning and deployment of its military force must be along the periphery of Taiwan’s adjacent areas containing sovereign significance. It poses an absurd contradictory thinking.
The situation in the Taiwan Strait is filled with risks arousing numerous global discussions. But in reality, outsiders do not thoroughly understand the cross-strait relations and true facts before making judgements which might be cited or quoted by researchers without examining their credibility. It would lead to significant misconceptions and errors in thinking, that is the most critical problem in current research on PLA and Beijing’s political situation. When examining perspectives held by foreign think tank research teams, it should be cautious to evaluate their credibility to avoid blindly following and partially favoring.
（Translated to English by Tracy Chou）
