(Hsien-Sen Lin, Professor, Department of East Asian Studies, National Taiwan Normal University)
The US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (also commonly known as US-Japan “2+2”) jointly attended by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense of both the US and Japan (the Ministers) was convened in Tokyo on July 28, and a joint statement was subsequently released. The Japanese media reports for this meeting focused on the reconstitution of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) to a Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) with operational command authority, which will complement Japan's establishment of the JSDF Joint Operations Command (JJOC) under unified command by 2024. Both sides will set up a task force for further negotiations. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated in the meeting that the expansion of the USFJ to JFHQ “will be the most significant change to USFJ since its creation and one of the strongest improvement to the Alliance’s military cooperation in seventy years.”
Under the current structure of the USFJ, its commander only has authority for base management while its operational command still remains directly under the US Indo-Pacific Command. The simultaneous changes of the commanding system of both sides signify faster and smoother operational commands in the future and Japan’s facing an unprecedented defense threats sine the post-war period. Based on the joint statement of the “2+2 meeting,” the threats mainly include China’s attempts to change the regional status quo through its power or coercion, the continued enhancement of military cooperation between China and Russia, and China’s support for Russia’s defense industry to strengthen its sustained operational capacities in the Ukraine war. These threats have caused serious concerns from the US-Japan alliance and international community and posed the greatest challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, which imply that the threat of China is the primary driving force to achieve the modernization of the US-Japan Alliance.
Firstly, the joint statement explicitly states that both sides reaffirmed their intent to implement new strategic initiatives proposed during the US-Japan Summit on April 10, with the vision to pursue modernization of the Alliance. The initiatives, in addition to the above-mentioned upgrading Alliance command and control (C2), also include consideration of integrating Japan into the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) security partnership Pillar II advanced capability projects, strengthening the networked regional security framework cored on the US-Japan Alliance, deepening defense industry and advanced technology cooperation, and US providing equipment and technology to support Japan for developing counterstrike capabilities effectively. In the Summit, Baiden expressed that the modernization of the US-Japan C2 system was the focus of his talk with Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, noting that the modernization of the Alliance will increase the interoperability of both militaries and stressing that “this is the most significant upgrade in our alliance since it was first established.” It was exactly as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated in the beginning of the “2+2 meeting,” that this meeting delivered on the commitment made in the US-Japan Summit.
The idea of US-Japan Alliance modernization first appeared in the joint statement of the “2+2 meeting” issued on January 7, 2022. After a pre-meeting negotiation, both the US and Japan released their updated national security and defense strategic documents respectively in October of the same year, as a foundation of the Alliance’s modernization. In the “2+2 meeting” held on January 11, 2023, the five visions of implementing the Alliance’s modernization were issued, which was approved in the US-Japan Summit two days later. In the Summit, Baiden praised Japan for significantly increasing defense budget and drawing up a new national security strategy, constructing the basis for modernizing US-Japan military alliance. And the joint statement of the Summit also commended that the “2+2 meeting” “has made unprecedented progress in the modernization of US-Japan Alliance.”
As a matter of fact, aside from the reconstitution of the C2 system of both militaries, there are several noteworthy highlights from the outcome of the “2+2 meeting” this time. First, the US will accelerate the provision of Tomahawk cruise missiles and help expedite the development of the stand-off missiles to increase Japan’s long-range defense and counterstrike capabilities. In addition, both sides will strengthen the co-production and -development of weapon equipment (air-defense missiles) through regular negotiations under Defense Industry Cooperation, Acquisition, and Sustainment (DICAS). They will also facilitate maintenance and repair of US naval and air force equipment in Japap to enhance the sustained operational capabilities of both forces. On the day of the meeting, both sides signed an agreement for Japan to sell its domestically-produced Patriot PAC-3 Missiles to the US to complement the deficiency caused by US supports for Ukraine. Second, Japan will intensify its defense deployment in the southwestern islands and the US-Japan Alliance will also increase its joint exercises in the region, that will strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities in this significant region. Third, the regularly convened Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) at pragmatic level of both sides since 2010 has been elevated to ministerial-level strategic dialogue and held its first dialogue upon the closing of the “2+2 meeting” to demonstrate US commitment to providing a “nuclear umbrella” to Japan. Fourth, a multilateral security and defense cooperation framework cored on the US-Japan Alliance, together with Australia, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, Canada and India will be established to increase the capability of maritime domain awareness (MDA) in Indo-Pacific region.
On the day of the 2+2 meeting, South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik visited Japan for the first time to attend the Japan-South Korea defense ministers meeting after a hiatus of 15 years as well as the US-Japan-South Korea defense ministers meeting. In the Japan-South Korea bilateral meeting, both sides decided to initiate the annual exchange plan for defense ministers and high-level military leaders and to resume the joint search and rescue exercise (SAREX) of both forces. In the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral meeting, discussions focused on the implications of North Korea-Russia increasing military cooperation and the regional situations in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. It confirmed that the bilateral and trilateral high-level defense policy dialogue shall be held periodically every year and that the real time intelligence on North Korea’s missile launches shall be shared among the three parties.
Moreover, the US, Japan and South Korea signed a trilateral memorandum regarding institutionalizing the security cooperation so as to efficiently organize and conduct joint exercises. And in the following day, the ministerial-level meeting of Japan-the US-India-Australia Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) was held in Tokyo after a hiatus of 4 years. In the joint statement issued after the meeting, it reaffirmed that the four parties commit to jointly build “a free and open Indo-Pacific region” based on the rule of international law and strongly oppose the unilateral attempt to change the status quo of this region, implicitly criticizing China for its attempt to alter the status quo of the South China Sea and the East China Sea. It revealed the limitation of QUAD’s policy toward China.
This article believes that the convening of the “2+2 meeting” this time is a new step in dealing with China’s attempt to unilaterally alter the status quo of the region through its power or coercion. Both the US and Japan are racing against time to modernize the Alliance’s system aiming at enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities. The greatest significance of this modernization lies in Japan’s complete shift of its longstanding “self-defense only” principle and the defense division under the US-Japan security framework where the Self-Defense Forces play the “shield” while the US military the “spear.” With a substantial increase in its defense budget and the supports of the US, the JSDF is building its counterstrike capability for stand-off strikes. Additionally, in light of Russia’s unscrupulous nuclear intimation in the battlefield of Ukraine and China’s large-scale and rapid increase in its nuclear strength, the US has elevated the EDD to the 2+2 ministerial-level meeting to ensure Japan for US commitment of a “nuclear umbrella” and to enhance the intensity of bilateral extended deterrence consultations. Furthermore, it is also a significant part of the modernization of the US-Japan Alliance to build a “US-Japan +” multilateral defense cooperation centered on the US-Japan Alliance, together with countries having shared-value. It is also a part of the US “integrated deterrence” strategy working with its allies.
（Translated to English by Tracy Chou）
