(Yang Tai-yuan, Contract Research Fellow, Institute of Chinese Communist Studies)
On September 9, 2024, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced on its website: “According to the annual plan and the consensus reached between China and Russia, the Russian military will dispatch naval and air forces in September to participate in the ‘Northern United-2024’ exercise held by China in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk.”
On September 6, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Northern Theater Command Navy’s 1st Destroyer Squadron (based in Xiaokouzi, Huangdao, Qingdao, Shandong) dispatched the Type 055 destroyer Wuxi (pennant number: 104), the Type 052D destroyer Xining (117), the Type 054A frigate Linyi (547), the Type 903A comprehensive supply ship Taihu (889), the Tianlangxing spy ship (794), and three Z-20KS multi-purpose utility helicopters. The participating fleet is estimated to include 1-2 Type 039B/C submarines. The fleet set sail from the Port of Qingdao in Shandong, passing through the Tsushima Strait between Japan and Korea in two groups, moving towards the Sea of Japan. After a three-day voyage, the Chinese fleet arrived in the designated exercise area at 4 p.m. on September 9, meeting up with a Russian Pacific Fleet, which included the frigate Marshal Shaposhnikov (543), the destroyer Admiral Panteleev (548), and the corvette Hero of the Russian Federation Aldar Tsydenzhapov (339), among others.
In terms of air support, the PLA Air Force participating units included the 38th Regiment of the 13th Air Division (based in Wuhan, Hubei) with Y-20 transport aircrafts and aerial refueling tankers, the 47th Regiment of the 16th Special Air Division (based in Shenyang, Liaoning) with KJ-500 early warning aircraft, four J-16s from the 3rd Brigade (based in Qiqihar, Heilongjiang), and J-10Bs from the 61st Brigade (based in Yanji, Jilin). These aircraft departed from different airports and flew to the Russian Knevichi airfield near Vladivostok. The Russian military participating forces, including Su-30SM fighters, MiG-31BM interceptors, and Il-38 anti-submarine patrol aircraft, were deployed under the command of the Russian Eastern Military District’s 11th Air Defense Group and the Pacific Fleet’s naval aviation.
The exercise’s naval drills are predicted to include joint air defense, joint anti-submarine warfare, mine countermeasures, surface firing, and joint rescue operations. Air drills are predicted to include joint air defense interception, ground attack, and sea control operations. The exercise officially started on September 10 and spans the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk, lasting until late September. During this period, the Chinese military will also participate in Russia’s “Ocean-2024” strategic exercise, which ends on September 16. After the exercise, the Chinese and Russian naval formations will proceed to jointly patrol relevant waters of the Pacific Ocean for the fifth time.
Since the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022, Russia has been in urgent need of Chinese support. China has been covertly assisting Russia with military supplies through “grey zone” operations and military-civil fusion. The frequent high-level exchanges between Chinese and Russian leaders and military officials have elevated the bilateral relationship to an “invisible alliance,” with China openly stating that “there are no limits to China-Russia relations.” This implies that while there is no formal alliance treaty between the two, their practical relationship surpasses treaty obligations. In recent years, the two militaries have conducted joint exercises in various domains, including the “Joint Air Strategic Patrol,” “Joint Maritime Patrol,” and the “Northern United” and “Eastern” series, among others. Notably, in the fifth “China-Russia Joint Air Strategic Patrol” on November 30, 2022, Chinese H-6K bombers landed at Vladivostok International Airport, while Russian Tu-95 strategic bombers landed at Jianqiao Airport in Hangzhou. In the sixth patrol on June 6, 2023, Russian Tu-95s landed at Nanjing Airport. In the eighth patrol on July 25, 2024, Chinese H-6K bombers (two aircrafts), Y-20 aerial refueling tankers transport aircrafts, and KJ-500 command and control aircraft flew to Elizovo Airport in Kamchatka for staging, followed by joint patrols with the Russian Aerospace Forces. The exercises show that China and Russia have reached agreements and signed legal documents allowing each other’s military aircrafts, including armed aircrafts, to land at domestic airports. This indicates a deeper level of cooperation and mutual trust, as Chinese early warning and electronic warfare aircraft are now integrated into the Russian command chain.
Prior to the start of the exercise, Chinese commanders set up a battlefield command post, demonstrating that China’s mobile operational command centers are now fully operational abroad. Supported by a comprehensive space-based information system, China can quickly establish joint operational command posts in foreign locations.
The “Northern United-2024” exercise, led by the PLA Northern Theater Navy, is intertwined with Russia’s “Ocean-2024” strategic exercise. The close coordination between the two militaries highlights strategic flexibility, complexity, and realism, while also deepening their operational cooperation, especially in the previously restricted Sea of Okhotsk. This level of trust is unprecedented, as Russia has historically restricted access to this area.
On June 1, 2023, Russia opened the Port of Vladivostok to China for cross-border transportation of domestic trade goods. From July 20 to 23 of the same year, the “Northern United-2023 Exercise” was held in the central waters of the Sea of Japan. On September 10, 2024, the “Northern United-2024 Exercise” was held in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk. The two countries’ consecutive joint exercises in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk over two years are a response and countermeasure against Japan’s strengthening of military deployments.
In conclusion, the frequency of joint military exercises between China and Russia is increasing from once to twice a year, with expanding scales and forces. These exercises are aimed at constraining US forces in the Indo-Pacific region and countering US-led strategies. Additionally, the use of Vladivostok as a projection base by the Chinese Navy suggests a potential extension of its operational range to the Sea of Japan. The possibility of China gaining direct land access to Vladivostok remains an important development to our attention.
（Translated to English by Chen Cheng-Yi）
