(Tung Chieh Tsai, Distinguished Professor, Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University)
Despite the Korean Peninsula issue has been one of the major regional security hotspots in East Asia since the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, it had once fallen into a relatively static stalemate. And, because of the existence of the “Six-Party Talks”, a multilateral mechanism, the North Korean issue was once under “control” from 2003-2009. However, since Pyongyang withdrew from the “Six-Party Talks” in 2009, the peninsula situation has been in continuous conflict escalation, except for a brief turning point in 2018.
North Korea conducted five intensive nuclear tests from 2009-2017, and the ROKS Cheonan sinking in 2010 brought the two Koreas to the brink of conflict. After Kim Jong-un took power in 2011, the number of missile tests far exceeded that of the previous two leaders from 2014 to 2017 and kept increasing annually, bringing the peninsula to the brink of war in 2017. The election of Moon Jae-in as South Korea president in 2017 brought a chance for easing tensions, with the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics as a turning point, during which North Korea unusually halted all missile tests, and Kim met with Moon three times within a year. However, North Korea escalated the tension again with a record 26 missile tests in 2019 and It blew up the Inter-Korean Liaison Office in Kaesong and redeployed troops to the Demilitarized Zone in 2020, further raising the crisis atmosphere. Particularly, when Yoon Suk-yeol, who tends to take a tough stance against North Korea, assumed the presidency in 2022, North Korea subsequently conducted a record 41 missile tests that year. In 2023, after the termination of 2018 Military Agreement, a symbol of peace, Kim officially announced the ‘abandonment of unification,’ stating that the north-south relation is no longer “one nation” but rather in “hostile” or “wartime” status. Subsequently, North Korea decided to abolish the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, the Committee for National Economic Cooperation, and the Mount Kumgang International Tourism Administration, that are related to South Korea in 2024, stressing that South Korea should be regarded as North Korea’s “primary foe and invariable principal enemy.” Then, it decided to destroy the railways and highways connecting to South Korea, permanently cutting off and locking down the southern border in October. .
Notably, “extreme provocation” has become the fundamental national policy under Kim Jong-un’s rule, even if the South Korea inclines to ease tensions. The question is, what is the intention behind such provocations? And what kind of conflict scenarios will this continuous development bring to the peninsula?
For the Former, the answer is simple. First, instead of solely developing nuclear weapons and even conducting military provocations, North Korea’s true concern is how to acquire external assistance through intimidation, and then address challenges with the assistance. Though the aid acquired is often insufficient and often comes with various attached conditions, Pyongyang seemingly has no better alternatives. Secondly, when extreme provocations cause extreme external pressure (from the US), it becomes a vicious cycle to compress Pyongyang’s policy options. Kim proposed a “Five-Year Economic Development Plan” at the Workers’ Party Congress in 2016, that expired in 2020, while its economy still remained in distress, and even worse because of the pandemic and border closures. Kim was compelled to apologize and left no other option but resort to external provocations to increase internal cohesion in order to save his power.
As for the latter, the possibility of a war breaking out is not high from a rational perspective. The answer is also simple because conflict will end up with a lose-lose scenario for both sides. Aside from the fact that North Korea, struggling with its economic distress, can hardly sustain a large-scale confrontation, South Korea, with its capital too close to the north, is also hard to avoid paying a heavy cost. Both sides are well aware of this reality. But the key point is in North Korea. The long-term escalation of tensions since 2009 indicates one fact: if economy had a chance to maintain stable (regardless of growth), under conditions of regime secured, why would Pyongyang head towards such a desperate end?
From another perspective, the issue is not solely with Pyongyang. It is well known that the Korean Peninsula has been a “strategic buffer zone” between the Western and Eastern camps (US vs Russia or US vs China) to prevent a direct confrontation since the ceasefire of Koran War in 1953. During the Cold War, the US principal enemy was Soviet Union and its overall strategic deployment leaning towards “emphasizing Europe over Asia,” contributing to the stability of the peninsula. In the post-Cold War era, the US, in particular, decided to “re-engage in Asia” and to promote “rebalance” since 2012, it has shifted its primary adversary to Beijing. Therefore, it is understandable that the security in the island chain is tense and the escalation of conflict in the peninsula is naturally inevitable. In other words, “the one who ties the knot must untie it,” meaning the future of the peninsula's situation depends on US-China relations. The outcome of the 2024 US presidential election will be the next key point to observe.