Analysis of the Recent Activities of the PLA Rocket Force

Release Date : 2024-10-24

 

Tai-yuan Yang, Contract Research Fellow of the Institute of Chinese Communist Studies

Our Ministry of National Defense announced that they had detected multiple testing operations by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force in Mongolia on July 13, 2024. The PLA Rocket Force launched a DF-31AG intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from a mobile platform near Wenchang City, Hainan Province on September 25. The missile flew for 27 minutes and traveled around 11,700 kilometers before landing in the South Pacific Ocean, near the international dateline. On the evening of September 29, our Ministry of National Defense announced that they had detected multiple missile launches by the PLA Rocket Force and Army long-range artillery units in Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Qinghai, and Xinjiang since 6:50 AM on September 28.

On October 17, 2024, the Financial Times reported that the PLA conducted a “Joint Sword-2024B” exercise around Taiwan and launched two missiles towards inland targets on the 14th. On the same day, during his inspection in Anhui Province, Xi Jinping visited the Rocket Force’s 61st Base of 611th Brigade (Unit 96711) and stressed that it is needed to deeply implement the thought of building a strong military and follow the military strategic guidelines in the new era, to have good command and make best use of the weapons for the construction of the strategic missile forces, to insist on political leadership and strengthen sense of responsibilities, to work diligently and promote high-quality development of the forces, to enhance strategic deterrence and combat capabilities, and to resolutely fulfill the tasks entrusted by the Party and the people.

The Financial Times revealed that during the Joint Sword-2024B exercise, the PLA Rocket Force launched two missiles towards inland targets. Judging from the photos published, the two missiles are identified as DF-15B, which has a range of 800 km and was deployed to the Second Artillery Corps. They have reached the end of their service life and are being gradually phased out. In addition, based on news photos released after Xi’s inspection, the missiles presented to him are identified as DF-26B ballistic missiles. DF-26 has multiple variants: DF-26A, quipped with a nuclear warhead, DF-26B, featuring a conventional warhead designed for land attack, and DF-26C, designed as an anti-ship missile, additionally equipped with radar guidance for detecting and tracking sea surface targets. A total of 25 launch vehicles were presented, with 5 vehicles demonstrating the launch process indoors, and the other 25 vehicles lining up outdoors for inspection. DF-26 series was fitted in the Rocket Force in 2018, with a maximum range of around 5000 km, capable of carrying both nuclear and conventional warheads by a solid-fuel engine, allowing it to target high-value land targets as well as medium- and large-mobile vessels like aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and amphibious assault ships. The warheads are capable of maneuvering and altering trajectory, achieving speeds over Mach 18 in its final phase. When targeting land, it has a precision of about 30 meters.

Judging from the news photos released by China, both the DF-15B and DF-26B missiles are launched from road mobile system, bypassing the need for fixed launch sites. It appears that the Rocket Force’s various types of solid-fuel, vehicle-mounted ballistic missiles are gradually upgrading their launch tubes with “advanced suspended launch tubes and self-adjusting extended rubber base technology.” The modified missile launch vehicle only needs a relatively flat area for missile erection and necessary measurements before launching. After firing, it can move easily to the next launch site. In other words, the PLA Rocket Force has developed rapid strike and withdrawal capabilities.

It’s the practice of the PLA not to showcase the most advanced weaponry. The mode of military industrial development emphasizes “exploring one generation, pre-researching one generation, developing one generation, and equipping one generation.” In other words, the recent display of DF-15B, DF-26B, and DF-31AG by the Rocket Force during military drills and inspections implies that the Rocket Force has been equipped with more advanced ballistic missiles such as DF-16B, DF-17, DF-27, and DF-41. Therefore, based on the mode of military industrial development, a new generation of ballistic missile is in research stage, and the current ballistic missiles that have reached service life (even after extensions) are being phased out and replaced with newer models. It is expected that the DF-11A and DF-15B will be replaced by the longer-range and more precise DF-16 in the next five years.

The sudden public release of the full-process test launch footage of the DF-31AG suggests PLA’s intention to demonstrate its technical capabilities in ICBM project. It wants to prove that its various types of ICBM meet the design specifications and also satisfy operational requirements. At the same time, it indirectly debunks online rumors that corruption among military officials led to the use of “water” as a substitute fuel for the intercontinental missiles. Moreover, Xi Jinping intends to announce to the world, through this full-process launch test, that the Rocket Force has successfully completed its reform and the PLA’s nuclear arsenal is ready for immediate operation. 

During the Joint Sword-2024B exercise, two DF-15B were launched towards inland targets, intending to demonstrate its “joint fire strike” capabilities to Taiwan. Particularly, the soon-to-be-retired DF-15B precisely hit the planned target, significantly demonstrating that the DF-16, replacement of DF-11A and DF-15B, promises even greater striking power and precision.

Xi Jinping inspected the Rocket Force’s 61st Base of the 611th Missile Brigade, toured the unit’s historic exhibition room, and interacted with its officers and men. He praised and encouraged the successful transformation of the Rocket Force in his speech, and the display of a new Rocket Force, whose combat capabilities meet the performance standards, demonstrates that it still remains the Party’s iron guard, firmly under Xi’s control. In other words, Xi’s inspection of the 611th Missile Brigade was deliberately arranged to convey to the Rocket Force that the “ratification” has concluded. According to public information, the 61st Base of the 611th Missile Brigade was originally equipped with DF-21 series missiles; however, after the publication of a report regarding “China’s Rocket Force” by China Aerospace Studies Institute of the US Air University in 2022, it is probably that the Rocket Force has adjusted its deployment internally to include the displayed DF-26 missiles.

The Rocket Force tested the DF-31AG ICBM in the international waters of the South Pacific and showcased its DF-26B through Xi Jinping’s inspection. It intends to demonstrate the strength of its nuclear arsenal, including DF-31AG, DF-41, and DF-5B intercontinental missiles that can be launched from central China and fly over the arctic, through Alaska and reach the eastern US. In other words, China is capable of striking the entire US with its nuclear arsenal. In addition, DF-17, DF-21D, DF-26C and DF-28 anti-ship ballistic missiles are gradually building a 5000 km security defense chain at sea. The US believes that PLA will use its Rocket Force, Navy, and Air Force to conduct “anti-access/aera denial (A2/AD)” strategy to prevent US forces from entering the Indo-Pacific region and intervening in conflicts in the Taiwan Strait.

In fact, PLA doesn’t agree with the concept of “anti-access/area denial.” Instead, it focuses on the strategy and tactics of “resisting military intervention from strong adversaries.” This indicates that the PLA will employ various efforts to push the enemy out of its 5000 km security defense chain. It will choose to “take the initiative” and “keep offensive intent,” rather than the passive “denial.” The primary aim is to use “war” to deter the adversaries from intervening and unwilling to engage. 

Translated to English by Tracy Chou