(By Chen-Shen Yen, Adjunct Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University)
Currently, media and scholars' understanding of summits in international relations can be generally divided into two types. One type includes the annual summits of large international organizations such as the G7, G20, BRICS, APEC, East Asia Summit (EAS), and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The other type refers to smaller, one-on-one summits held by national leaders either as state visits or to discuss and negotiate significant issues. The former needs no further elaboration, while the latter has numerous notable examples from the last century. They include the 1972 summit between U.S. President Richard Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev during Nixon’s visit to Moscow, the 1986 Reykjavik Summit between US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Iceland, and, of course, the Camp David Sumit where Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat signed the Camp David Accords at the witness of the US President Jimmy Carter.
In this century, the opportunities for leaders of major countries to meet within the above-mentioned large international organizations have significantly increased. When they meet at multilateral summits, there are usually more sideline meetings. As a result, even though one-on-one summits outside of these occasions still occur from time to time, they are less valued to some extent compared to the past. Meetings between leaders not affiliated to these international organizations have instead become exceptions. For instance, the three summits between the leaders of two Koreas, Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-un within six months in 2018, as well as the two summits between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un in Singapore and the Korean Peninsula's Demilitarized Zone at Panmunjom in 2018-2019, respectively. They are given significant attention because of the international reality that North Korea is a pariah state, not belonging to any regional international organizations, and that it is unlikely for Kim Jong-un to meet with Western leaders under normal circumstances.
As for the sideline meetings of international organizations, they offer the opportunities for one-on-one discussions outside of the summits (in fact, it is a meeting between two leaders and their teams). And if time permits, a national leader could hold sideline meetings with several counterparts during a multilateral summit. More interestingly, this year's APEC meeting was held in Lima, capital of Peru, from November 15 to 16. After a one-day break, the leaders of the United States, mainland China, Japan, South Korea, Canada, Mexico, Indonesia, and Australia, who are also members of APEC and G20, will meet again at the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in the same region from November 18 to 19. This is similar to the situation last year when the East Asia Summit (EAS) was held in Jakarta, Indonesia, on September 6-7, followed two days later by another meeting of many leaders in New Delhi, India, on September 9-10. However, both summits were attended by Chinese Premier Li Qiang last year, instead of the usual practice where the Premier attends the former (EAS) and the President attends the latter (G20). On the US side, President Joe Biden only attended the G20, while the EAS was attended by Vice President Kamala Harris. Therefore, the leaders of both countries did not meet at these two summits. However, they had a sideline meeting at the APEC Summit in San Francisco two months later. In any case, Chinese leaders regularly hold sideline meetings with leaders of major powers and important regional countries at international summits, which remains a positive mechanism for stabilizing unstable international relations through communication and dialogue to strengthen relations and resolve conflicts.
At this year's APEC Summit, Xi Jinping held bilateral sideline meetings with several leaders, including Peru's President Dina Boluarte during his state visit prior to the summit, as well as with Joe Biden, Shigeru Ishiba, Yoon Suk-yeol, Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon, and Chilean President Gabriel Boric Font. Among them, the latter four leaders did not attend the G20 summit, so it was foreseeable that Xi Jinping would meet them at the APEC framework. Although Biden is about to step down, the international status of the U.S. and China is extraordinary, and the two leaders have not met for a year. Therefore, delaying their meeting until G20 could easily cause unnecessary speculations. Since Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has just taken office, it is understandable that Xi hopes to clarify the bilateral relations between the two countries and avoid misunderstandings. As for the meeting with Yoon Suk-yeol, it may be related to North Korea's recent deployment of troops to Ukraine and the tense situation on the Korean Peninsula. Of course, it could be because Xi has to meet with the European leaders of the UK, Germany, and France at the G20, making it difficult to schedule for additional talks.
At the G20 summit in Rio, Xi Jinping, as expected, met with several leaders of non-APEC member countries, such as UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Additionally, he held bilateral talks with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, who are members of both APEC and G20. Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, though taking office this year, had already met with Xi during his visit in Beijing in early November. Therefore, despite Prabowo’s attendance of both summits, no sideline meeting was arranged between the two leaders.
President Biden personally attended both summits, but as a lame-duck president, he should have been completely overlooked. However, since the United States remains the leading power, the leaders of the participating countries greeted him out of courtesy. The summit between Xi and Biden was considered the highlight of the latter's trip to South America. Additionally, participating leaders such as Shigeru Ishiba, Lawrence Wong, and Paetongtarn Shinawatra for APEC, as well as Keir Starmer, and Claudia Sheinbaum for G20, are all new heads of state this year. Xi Jinping's sideline meetings with them were naturally aimed at establishing a stable foundation for future interactions and dialogue.
Overall, several leaders attending the two summits are either newly appointed (UK, Japan, Mexico, Thailand, Singapore), weakened in domestic parliamentary elections (France, South Korea, India, South Africa), about to step down (US, Germany), or sanctioned and unable to attend (Putin). In contrast, Xi Jinping's position appears to have more continuity, which may explain his prominent leading role at these two summits.
However, what we are more concerned about is whether these one-on-one meetings involve issues related to Taiwan. The conversation between Xi Jinping and Lawrence Wong, as revealed by Chinese media, sparked controversy which lies in Wong’s expressing support for the “one China Principle.” From our (Taiwan) perspective, Singapore's stance actually aligns with that of the US on the "One China Policy,” instead of the "One China Principle.” After Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed doubts, Singapore indeed acknowledged that it adopts a "One China Policy.” However, it also publicly opposes Taiwan independence, which is different from the long-standing U.S. stance of not supporting Taiwan independence.
In his meeting with Shigeru Ishiba, Xi expressed hope that Japan would properly handle major issues of principle, such as history and Taiwan. Shigeru Ishiba stated that Japan maintains its position as outlined in the 1972 Joint Communiqué when the two countries established diplomatic ties—Japan recognizes the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China. And Japan fully understands and respects China’s stance that Taiwan is an inseparable part of its territory. After Shigeru Ishiba said what Beijing wanted to hear, he naturally brought up economic-related issues, including high-level economic dialogues between the two sides, avoiding economic decoupling between the two countries, multi-faceted cooperation including environmental issues, and the resumption of seafood imports from Japan. Japan is essentially an ally of the US, so Shigeru Ishiba regards Beijing's long-term military buildup and expanded maritime activities in the East and South China Seas as problematic. He expressed to Xi his deep concern about China's military activities around Japan. If Shigeru Ishiba could make China reopen Japan’s seafood imports while expressing Japan’s national defense concerns, it will certainly benefit his tenure as Prime Minister. However, this does not take into account the factors related to the United States after Trump takes office in two months.
As for the outgoing Biden, in his meeting with Xi Jinping before stepping down, he recalled the times and places they had met, noting that they might have different views on many issues, they have always been open and straightforward with each other. Despite their competition, they have managed to avoid conflict as much as possible. However, it is noteworthy that international media, including those from Taiwan, did not comment on one of Biden’s word choices. In his opening remarks, Biden unexpectedly used the word "alliance" and then added "relationship" to describe US-China relations: "We are the most important alliance, or most important relationship in the world. …And how we get along together is going to impact the rest of the world." If this was a slip of the tongue, perhaps the White House news release could have made a slight revision, but it was clear that Biden was reading verbatim, so the full text was published.
Taiwan is most concerned about the statements of the two major powers regarding Taiwan. Xi Jinping still adheres to the "One China Principle,” upholding the three Sino-US Joint Communiqués, and outlines China’s four red lines, namely the Taiwan issue, democracy and human rights, the system of governance, and development rights. He also stressed that Taiwan independence activities are incompatible with peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. If the U.S. wishes to maintain regional peace, it is crucial to recognize the Taiwan independence nature of Lai Ching-te and the Democratic Progressive Party administration, handle the Taiwan issue cautiously, clearly oppose Taiwan independence, and support China's peaceful reunification. The latter two points reveals Beijing’s attempts, in recent years, to pressure the US to change its stance of "not supporting Taiwan independence and hoping for a peaceful solution of cross-strait disputes," but Biden did not compromise.
However, Biden stated that the U.S. will continue to adhere to the "One China Policy” and outlined the "Six No's," not seeking a new Cold War, not seeking to change China's system, not seeking to oppose China through strengthened alliances, not supporting Taiwan independence, not seeking conflict with China, and not using the Taiwan issue to compete with China. This statement weakens the leverage of the "Taiwan card" in the US-China competition, worthy our continued attention.
（Translated to English by Tracy Chou）
