South Korea’s “Martial Law Crisis” Tests the US Indo-Pacific Strategy

Release Date : 2024-12-16

Chao Chun-shan, Professor Emeritus, Tamkang University

The martial law crisis sparked by South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has reached a boiling point, with public anger showing no signs of abating. The opposition’s impeachment case has unfolded in waves. Following the National Assembly’s passage of the “Special Prosecution Act on Rebellion” on the 10th of this month, investigations have zeroed in on Yoon himself and other key figures. South Korea’s democratic society is now facing its most profound challenge in decades.

Yoon’s declaration of martial law can be viewed as a desperate gambit in an ongoing internal power struggle. The ruling party finds itself outnumbered and cornered, while Yoon, battered by allegations of cronyism and political scandals, has seen his public approval ratings plummet. Given the Korean Peninsula’s volatile situation, the crisis’s ripple effects have drawn intense international attention—particularly from the United States.

The US, which shares democratic values and geopolitical interests with South Korea, is naturally disinclined to see the “pro-US” Yoon forced out of office over what many call a “self-coup.” President Joe Biden has worked hard to advance the Indo-Pacific strategy by fostering reconciliation between Japan and South Korea, helping them move past historical disputes. However, the Biden administration, having received no prior warning of Yoon’s actions, has refused to endorse his declaration of martial law.

US State Department Deputy Spokesperson Vedant Patel commented that the impeachment case is an internal matter for South Korea and expressed confidence it would proceed in accordance with the nation’s constitution. Patel also stressed that the “US-South Korea alliance and partnership are not tied to any individual president or administration.” This statement suggests the Biden administration is distancing itself from Yoon’s actions and is mentally prepared for the possibility of a leadership change in South Korea.

In an interview with Reuters on the 4th of this month, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed hope to leave his successor Marco Rubio with the strongest possible “cards” to address various challenges. While Trump’s top priority in office would likely remain addressing domestic economic issues, his slogan of “Make America Great Again” leaves little room for ignoring the diplomatic messes left by predecessors. These include not only the Middle East and the Russo-Ukrainian war but also the latest “black swan” in South Korea.

The US Indo-Pacific Strategy Framework, established during Trump’s presidency in 2018, emphasizes maintaining America’s dominance in the region and deterring China from engaging in military action against the US and its allies. Although Trump’s first term saw him quarrel with allies over defense costs, it did not alter the shared commitment to countering China. Should Trump return to the White House, he is unlikely to abandon US military alliances with Japan and South Korea—even if Yoon leaves office prematurely. Contrary to speculation, a Trump administration would likely ensure no “cracks” appear in America’s anti-China strategy.

When addressing global hotspots like the Korean Peninsula, Trump’s approach leans toward “avoiding war” rather than “preparing for war,” let alone “seeking war.” Analysts note that during Trump’s four years in office, he reoriented US military strategies more significantly than many presidents had in eight years, proving he had little appetite for conflict. As a businessman at heart, Trump preferred economic tools to achieve political goals.

Consequently, many of Trump’s national security appointments were unorthodox political figures who shared his disdain for Washington’s “establishment” practices. These individuals would likely reject Blinken’s carefully crafted diplomatic strategies.

In sum, during another four years under Trump, the US would likely avoid overcommitting resources abroad, opting instead for “transactional diplomacy” with adversaries. Under such an approach, whether friend or foe, any country dealing with the US would need to carefully calculate its leverage and negotiate shrewdly.

Translated to English by Chen Cheng-Yi