（Research Fellow and Coordinator of the East Asia Centre at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Prashant Kumar）
A heinous terrorist attack facilitated by Pakistan killed 26 people, mostly tourists, at Baisaran meadow near Pahalgam on 22 April. The Resistance Front (TRF), a front for Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Pakistan-based terrorist organization proscribed by the UN, claimed responsibility twice, first on the same day immediately after the attack and then next day on 23 April. Later, it retracted its claim under probable pressure from the Pakistani government. It should be underlined that India had brought the TRF’s activities as a cover for Pakistan-based terrorist groups such LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad to the attention of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 1267 Sanctions committee in December 2023 and again in May and November 2024. Notably, Pakistan was successful in removing references to the TRF in the press statement on the terrorist attack issued by the UNSC on 25 April, reportedly with Chinese help.
India struck terror infrastructure within Pakistan as well as Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) on 7 May under Operation Sindoor. The next four days saw an intense military standoff between them. India did not initially target Pakistani military installations, but retaliated in quantity when Pakistan did so. The conflict was terminated with the ceasefire announcement on 10 May.
Commentators have discussed international responses to the episode. Among key international players who reacted to the crisis, China’s was perhaps the most important response that needs to be examined, owing to its own complicated relations with India and a longstanding Beijing-Islamabad axis that poses challenges to India’s security. An analysis of China’s response to the tensions between India and Pakistan reveals its strong desire to be recognised as a stakeholder in South Asia, facilitating “dialogue” between the two countries. However, the analysis also reveals that China is far from being a disinterested party in the India-Pakistan tensions, and is not in a position to play a faciliatory role between them.
China’s response to the India-Pakistan tensions after the Baisaran terrorist killings was multi-layered. On 23 April, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun “strongly” condemned the attack, stating that “China firmly opposes all forms of terrorism.” Later, on 10 May, Foreign Minister Wang Yi in his telephonic conversation with India’s National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval said that China “condemns the terrorist attack in Pahalgam area” and repeated that it “opposes all forms of terrorism.” This condemnation was a sort of shift in the Chinese position, as in the past, China had avoided using the words “terrorism” and “terrorist attack” in the context of Kashmir and avoided condemning the terrorist-generated violence there.
Yet China steered clear of making any reference to cross-border complicity in the heinous act. In fact, its demand for a “fair and just investigation” diluted its “strong” condemnation of the terrorist attack. The demand suggested that it was unwilling to accept Pakistan’s culpability. Previously, it demonstrated the same approach by demanding “evidence” while blocking India’s repeated efforts in the UNSC 1267 Sanctions Committee to sanction Pakistan-based terrorists accused of masterminding terrorist strikes in India. It is unclear what qualifies as “evidence” that is convincing enough to prove the rogue government’s culpability and fix responsibility in international terror cases. Evidence in such cases cannot be direct evidence as are required in criminal cases in municipal law. In such cases, they will be primarily circumstantial and intelligence intercepts, which India has nevertheless been sharing with the international community from time to time.
As for Indian strikes on terror infrastructure, China appeared to see them as a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and dignity, ignoring that India has the right to pursue terrorists and deliver justice to victims if Pakistan was incapable or unwilling to bring them to book. Chinese official statements and the official media exhibited a distinctive moral support and sympathy for Pakistan. They reiterated old Chinese understandings of Pakistan being a victim of terrorism and praised its efforts to combat terrorism. This approach ignores Pakistan’s own complicity in midwifing terrorism. China appeared not to consider the terrorist attack in Pahalgam as the original cause of the conflict. Nonetheless, it termed India’s punitive military strikes as “regrettable”; it did not outrightly condemn them.
Other notable points in the Chinese response included the forceful hyphenation of India with Pakistan in South Asia, calling them equally important countries in the region. China also projected itself as a stakeholder in peace and stability in the region and repeatedly expressed its willingness to play a “constructive” and “positive” role in “easing the tensions” and to promote talks to keep “the region peaceful and stable.”
In the given context, China’s advice to India and Pakistan to “return to the track of political settlement through peaceful means” seems to be referring to the Kashmir issue. However, such advice reflects incomplete appreciation of India’s position that talks on outstanding issues with Pakistan cannot be forced upon India through the blackmail of terror. A sweeping piece of counsel that both countries should “observe international law, including the UN Charter” also leads to speculation regarding China’s intention of internationalising the Kashmir issue. Incidentally, from 1979 onwards, China had gradually withdrawn from backing Pakistan’s bid to internationalise the Kashmir issue. It also gradually dropped the reference to the UN and encouraged them to resolve the issue bilaterally through dialogue. However, in recent years, certain actions such as its attempt to intercede on behalf of Pakistan in the UNSC, particularly after India’s abolition of Article 370 concerning Jammu and Kashmir in its Constitution in August 2019, seems to indicate it is reviewing its position on the Kashmir issue.
Furthermore, the speculation that China “helped Pakistan realign its radar and air defence systems to better detect Indian troop and aircraft movements… [and] assisted Pakistan in adjusting satellite surveillance over Indian territory during the two weeks between the April 22 attack… and the start of open hostilities” is a matter of grave concern, though the Indian government is yet to confirm its veracity. China’s arms sales to Pakistan are a longstanding reality and have been duly factored into India’s security calculations. Yet this sort of military coordination amidst India-Pakistan military conflict would directly undermine India’s interests and hurt its sensitivities, while running counter to China’s professed interest in peace and stability in the region. In case this speculation is authenticated, it will have far reaching consequences for India-China ties. China needs to come clean on this.
China’s repeated and continuous assertions that it is willing to play “a positive role” to facilitate dialogue between the two countries speaks to its eagerness to insert itself in the South Asian space. This desire is in line with China’s deepened economic presence in South Asia and also its consequent opening up to domestic and bilateral issues in the region. The desire is also in line with its Global Security Initiative.
That China, when condemning the terrorist attack, chose to use the milder word “regrettable” for India’s punitive military strikes and confirmed the opening of Mansarovar Yatra on 28 April amid rising India-Pakistan tensions, reveal that it is not willing to sacrifice its relations with India entirely at the altar of Sino-Pak ties. It apparently wants to maintain the normalisation momentum begun late last year after a four and half year long military stand-off in eastern Ladakh.
However, a reading of its response also reveals that its basic approach of shielding Pakistan for its role in fomenting terrorist violence in Kashmir essentially remains the same. Much of the Chinese response contradicts India’s position on the Kashmir issue. China is in possession of 5,000 thousand square kilometres of Kashmiri territory (Shaksgam Valley) disputed between India and Pakistan which was illegally ceded to it by the latter. Its unilaterally-announced China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) runs through the POK in utter disregard of Indian sentiment and sovereign claims. It continuously shields Pakistan in international bodies such as the 1267 Committee. It reportedly helped Pakistan to remove references to the TRF as late as 25 April 2025.
As of now, unfortunately China is not an appropriate medium to solve India’s Pakistan problem. It has to cover a lot of distance in order to establish itself as a disinterested party in India-Pakistan relations and the Kashmir issue. Presently, its willingness to play a “positive” or “constructive” role is merely an empty gesture that does not appeal to India, which does not welcome any third-party involvement in bilateral issues anyway.
