（Adjunct Distinguished Professor of Diplomacy and Director,Center for WTO Studies College of International Affairs National Chengchi University To-hai Liou）
Following the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Tianjin summit in late August and the September 3 military parade in Beijing this year, countries in Northeast Asia have suddenly become unusually proactive. While China seeks to capitalize on its momentum for further advancement, the United States and South Korea represent two other major driving forces. Of course, North Korea is not going to sit there idly by watching the show. Regardless of whether they view these two international events as crises or opportunities, these nations are attempting to take the initiative through proactive diplomacy in order to steer the situation in their favor. Among those recent diplomatic moves, the most evident one is from the successive proactive and dramatic U.S.-China interactions, including separate dialogues between their defense and foreign ministers, the bilateral Madrid trade negotiations which resulted in the agreement regarding TikTok. As the world's two largest economies intensify their engagement to stabilize bilateral relations, a delegation of U.S. lawmakers arrived in China in late September for talks. This marks the first visit to China by a U.S. House of Representatives delegation since 2019. After their talks over the phone last month, according to President Donald Trump he and his Chinese counterpart Xi jinping reached an agreement to meet in the forthcoming APEC summit in Gyeongju, rather than Beijing in October this year, extending Trump’s state visit to China to next year. Nevertheless, President Trump is reported to push forward with a schedule that includes visiting Japan on the 27th, holding a U.S.-Japan summit on the 28th, visiting South Korea on the the 29th, and departing South Korea next day. Subsequently, the United States and China impose port fees on each other's vessels. On the 10th, China issued multiple announcements imposing new export controls on rare earth materials and technologies, targeting at curbing US naval and air force buildup. In addition, The Wall Street Journal commentary regarded the move as an “economic nuclear war,” aiming at forcing the US to come to negotiation table by threatening to destroy the U.S. artificial intelligence industry through rare earth export restrictions. Obviously Both China and the United States have attempted to use various threats to increase their bargaining power before Presidents Trump and Xi sitting down at the negotiating table in Korea. Their bilateral relations remain very fluid and fraught with difficulties that are unlikely to be resolved overnight. There is still a long and thorny road ahead.
Immediately after the September 3 military parade, reports emerged that the draft of the new National Defense Strategy, spearheaded by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, would prioritize addressing domestic and regional missions over countering China and Russia. Colby has long been regarded as a China hawk. If this is indeed the case, it clearly reflects constraints imposed by Trump's transactional approach and his framework for great power diplomacy. In the same vein, while holding the first phone conversation with Chinese counterpart Dong Jun, U.S. Secretary of War Peter Hegseth emphasized that the United States does not seek conflict with China but will protect its vital interests in the Asia-Pacific region. It seems that a potential shift in their interactions from the previously dominant confrontation to increasingly giving way to a cooperation trend. They are now seeking mutually beneficial avenues to move forward.
Meanwhile, the U.S. and China continue to tread on each other's red lines so as to force the other side to make concessions. As Chinese officials characterized World War II-era documents as stating that Taiwan was ceded to the People’s Republic of China, the American Institute in Taiwan's (AIT) comments that World War-II era documents do not determine Taiwan's political status. Former AIT chairman Richard Bush in his e-mail mentioned that the US does not consider the political status of Taiwan to have been determined by any World War II-era documents, and that Washington expects the issue to be resolved peacefully. On the other hand, China accuses Nvidia of violating antitrust laws and other regulations over its acquisition of an Israeli networking equipment company. Targeting each other's vulnerabilities is standard practice before negotiations, ultimately paving the way for trade-offs once talks commence. The main reason is that China prioritizes politics over economics, and Taiwan remains its top priority, while the Trump administration focuses on reaping enormous economic gains from Beijing. Therefore, whether in high-level negotiations between US and Chinese officials in Madrid or in recent phone calls and forthcoming summits between US and Chinese leaders, Taiwan is inevitably on the negotiation table.
A commentary on Nikkei Asia is concerned that Washington's China policy has quietly shifted from confrontation to a transactional approach since Trump took office. The most telling example is the reversal of high-tech product policy. The US initially banned companies like Nvidia from selling advanced chips to China, only to lift the ban later. The Nikkei editorial expressed relief upon learning that, following the recent Trump-Xi phone call, the two leaders would meet at the APEC summit in Gyeongju rather than first convening in Beijing. It welcomed the fact that Trump did not make hasty concessions to China. Otherwise, a new international order dominated by the U.S., China, and Russia would take shape, relegating Japan to the status of a second-rate power. Despite this, Japan remains vigilant, considering that other surprises might happen and overshadow Japan’s status in the region. For example, Trump’s meeting with North Korea's top leader Kim Jong-un or a multilateral summit of its Northeast Asian neighbours without Japan’s participation. Against this background, even with a new prime minister yet to be selected at the time, Japan requested that U.S. President Donald Trump visit Tokyo before attending the APEC summit in South Korea, underscoring that the U.S.-Japan relationship is central to America's Indo-Pacific strategy.
In fact, South Korea is much more nervous than Japan, given that it is in a state of multiple crises. Seoul is very eager to improve relations with Beijing as soon as possible. At least three reasons why the Lee Jae-myung government is pursuing a proactive diplomacy toward Beijing. First, the Trump administration's maximum pressure campaign against the Lee Jae-myung government has forced South Korea to seek counterbalancing forces. Although President Lee Jae-myung stated during his visit to the U.S. Ausgust this year that South Korea could no longer adopt the past approach of “relying on the U.S. for security while prioritizing China economically,” he made strenuous efforts to appease Trump, temporarily defusing crises such as the U.S. insistence that South Korea explicitly agree to allow U.S. troops stationed in South Korea to support regional conflicts and avoiding signing a trade framework agreement on tariffs. U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick recently stated that since Lee Jae-myung's visit to the U.S. did not result in a trade agreement, South Korea must choose between accepting the tariff agreement or paying tariffs. If it does not accept U.S. demands, the previously agreed-upon 15% reciprocal tariffs will be restored to 25%. In an interview with Time magazine, Lee Jae-myung bluntly stated that had he fully accepted the U.S.'s harsh conditions at the time, he might have faced impeachment back home.
What South Korea finds even more intolerable is the recent raid by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on Hyundai's electric vehicle battery plant in Georgia. Accusing workers of illegal employment, US ICE arrested and detained 300 South Koreans, shackling them like serious criminals. Though later released and returned to South Korea, the incident caused an uproar in the country. Many view this as the U.S. pushing its advantage too far. While demanding South Korean investment and factory setup, the U.S. lacks relevant domestic talent, refuses to grant work visas generously to Koreans, and rigorously cracks down on illegal labor—effectively demanding results without providing the necessary resources. Faced with this impossible situation, Korean companies have announced a temporary halt to investments until visa issues are resolved. South Korea has prepared for the worst-case scenario, settling for a 25% tariff, as the U.S. is forcing South Korea to invest $350 billion in the U.S.—equivalent to 20% of its 2024 GDP (or 72% of its annual budget)—primarily in cash. Moreover, the investment projects will be determined by the U.S., and future profits will be split with the U.S. taking 90%. Trump even suggested that $350 billion is Seoul’s investment 'upfront'. Lutnick also pressed Korea to deliver more of the pledged funds in cash, not in the form of loans or guarantees. Lutnick, in recent conversations with South Korean officials, has discussed with Seoul the idea of slightly increasing the $350 billion they had previously guaranteed to the U.S. in July this year and suggested the final tally could get a bit closer to the $550 billion pledged by Japan, according to people familiar with the discussions, including an adviser to South Korea’s government. Tokyo also has a currency-swap deal with Washington, which it can tap for U.S. dollars in a crisis. South Korea lacks such a foreign-exchange arrangement and would potentially need to liquidate U.S. dollar reserves to fund the $350 billion. That sum would swallow up more than 80% of South Korea’s current dollar reserves, potentially leaving it vulnerable in a financial emergency. It is very likely to trigger a financial crisis in Korea. South Korea is attempting to use this argument as a reason to persuade the Trump administration to adopt a more lenient approach toward it.
North Korea is another key factor driving South Korea's proactive engagement with China. While inter-Korean relations remain hostile, Kim Jong-un's attendance at China's September 3 military parade—where he walked alongside world leaders Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin of China and Russia to watch the parade from Tiananmen Square—marked an unprecedented display of prestige. Kim Jong-un then has capitalized on this momentum to push for a summit with Trump. Given North Korea's designation of South Korea as its primary adversary, Kim is likely to bypass Seoul and focus solely on a Kim-Trump meeting. He might invite Trump to visit the newly opened Wonsan-Kalma Resort, rather than holding the trilateral summit in Pyongyang or Panmunjom without Lee Jae-myung’s presence. That is why Lee Jae-myung is striving to improve inter-Korean relations (behind the scene) and ensure South Korea is not sidelined in U.S.-North Korea negotiations. He called Trump a “peacemaker” when visiting the White House and expressed his willingness to serve as a “facilitator” to support him, reflecting precisely this intent.
Against this backdrop, the Lee Jae-myung government's announcement of a trial visa-free entry policy for Chinese group tourists to stay for up to 15 days, starting from September 29, right before China’s National Day long weekend. A positive and reciprocal response to Chinese provided the same treatment to South Korean previously. Moreover, Lee Jae-myung dispatched Foreign Minister Cho Hyun to Beijing. On the eve of his departure, Cho publicly declared that “the United States is no longer the nation that once cooperated with its allies.” Upon arriving in Beijing, he proposed to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi that Xi Jinping be invited to attend the coming October APEC summit in Gyeongju while also conducting a state visit to South Korea. In addition, Lee Jae-myung appointed Roh Jae-heon as ambassador to China, clearly aiming to mend the strained South Korea-China relationship. This move is significant not only because Roh's father, former President Roh Tae-woo, who facilitated the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two nations in 1991, but also because Roh Jae-hyun had already visited Beijing in late August as part of Lee Jae-myung's presidential special envoy delegation. President Xi Jinping’s last visit to South Korea was in 2014, so his visit to Seoul is of paramount importance for the bilateral relations. In reality, both South Korea and China oppose North Korea's nuclear weapons program, raising the possibility that Beijing might covertly facilitate secret meetings or even a summit between the two Koreas in the near future. Meanwhile, North Korea is eager to hold a summit with the United States. Kim Jong-un recently made two starkly contrasting remarks directed at South Korea and the United States. Kim Jong-un emphasized the two-state theory, drawing a clear line against improving inter-Korean relations. With the continuation of designating South Korea as an enemy state, he blamed South Korea for the deterioration of inter-Korean relations, stressed that unification is unnecessary, and stated that no negotiations will be conducted in his speech at the 13th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly in September this year. Conversely, Kim Jong-un expressed an openness to sitting down with Trump as long as the US drops its hollow obsession with denuclearization and wants to pursue peaceful coexistence with North Korea based on the recognition of reality during a speech before the North Korean parliament last month. Meanwhile, Kim Jong-un sent his Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui to Beijing for enhancing high-level exchanges, strengthen communication between the foreign ministries, promote practical cooperation and deepen multilateral collaboration. Her trip was followed by Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s visit to attend the 80th anniversary celebrations of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and pay an official goodwill visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) earlier this month.
According to the latest report, US President Trump's late October itinerary in Asia is packed with engagements. Before arriving in South Korea, he is scheduled to attend the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Malaysia from the 26th to the 28th. Then, Trump is expected to travel to Japan. Japan's Kyodo News reported that the U.S. and Japan are coordinating for him to visit Tokyo on the 27th and hold talks with Japan's newly elected prime minister Sanae Takaichi (高市早苗). Trump, arriving in South Korea on the 29th, will skip the APEC Leaders' Summit! His South Korea visit will focus solely on “business exchanges and the Trump-Xi meeting.” The Chinese side raised concerns about the U.S. response following the ministerial-level talks held in Spain in September. It stated its “firm opposition” to the U.S. strengthening the rules for its “Entity List” at the end of September, which effectively imposed an export ban, and expanding its scope. President Trump, reacting to China's rare earth export restrictions, announced on the 10th that additional tariffs would be imposed starting November 1st.
Conclusion
As South Korea's tariff negotiation team simultaneously engaged with Lutnick and Bessent to speed up talks on the U.S.-Korea investment fund ahead of the G20 summit in Gyeongju, CNN reported that President Trump is attempting to include a summit with North Korea's Kim Jong-un in his APEC itinerary. It cannot be ruled out that Trump is deliberately playing the North Korea card to pressure South Korea into concessions and hasten the conclusion of an investment agreement with the United States.
It is worth noting that Trump often adopts a tough stance toward smaller nations and allies, yet his approach toward major powers tends to be softer and more flexible. This is evident in his attitudes toward China and Russia. For instance, after speaking with Putin, he reversed his earlier pledge to supply Ukraine with Tomahawk cruise missiles—long-range weapons capable of striking deep into Russian territory. He demanded Ukraine cede Donetsk in exchange for a ceasefire, threatening otherwise that Russia would destroy Ukraine. Similarly, after Beijing announced strict rare earth export controls, he ceased labeling China as hostile, instead stating he had no intention of destroying China. It is abundantly clear that Trump cares most about economic gains and does not care about the feelings and interests of small and medium-sized countries and allies. Notably, just before the before Trump-Xi summit in South Korea, The U.S. think tank RAND released a report titled “Stabilizing the U.S.-China Rivalry”. Regarding how to maintain stable relations on the Taiwan issue, the report recommends that the United States and mainland China should signal their lack of intent to overturn the status quo. For instance, the U.S. could reaffirm its non-support for Taiwan independence and its non-opposition to peaceful reunification, while Beijing could clarify that military force would only be an option under the most extreme circumstances outlined in the Anti-Secession Law. The report also makes a bold recommendation, urging Washington to ensure Taiwan exercises restraint and does not use U.S. support to escalate cross-strait tensions. In short, as Taiwan is located in Northeast Asia, we must closely observe the changes in the surrounding situation, because any changes in the region will affect our political, economic and security.
