(Shuh-Fan Ding, Emeritus Professor, Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies, National Chengchi University)
Among the many issues concerning the military of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2025, the most striking was Xi Jinping’s large-scale purge of senior military leaders. At the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the CCP held in October 2025, 63% of full generals who were with the status of Central Committee members were absent, highlighting the extent of Xi’s purge of full generals. At the Fifth Session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection held in January 2026, 45.5% of generals who held the Commission membership were absent. It once again revealed that Xi’s purge was not limited to full generals but extended to the levels of lieutenant generals and even major generals.
However, what is even more surprising goes beyond this. Although dozens of full generals have been purged—leaving the Army, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, and People’s Armed Police without formally appointed commanders and political commissars, and the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission (CMC) still lacking a director—Xi has merely appointed chiefs of staff as acting commanders or let deputy directors supervise daily work. Xi shows no urgency in promoting new full generals to fill these vacancies. The only two promotions made to fill the posts were General Yang Zhibin to the Commander of the Eastern Theater Command, and General Han Shengyan to the Commander of the Central Theater Command. The question is why Xi is in no hurry to promote and fill these critical vacancies. In particular, some of the chiefs of staff presiding over daily work in their respective services are newly appointed, serving shortly in the current posts, thus lacking experience in leading their branches which could potentially hinder the development of the military.
The delay in filling so many vacancies involves two issues. The first is practical considerations. The training and promotion of leading officers is a gradual process. Normally, a single position requires 2 to 3 years of cultivation. If emphasis is placed on the requirements and capabilities of joint operations, an officer, starting from the rank of major general, needs to gain experience across different services, within the CMC and its Joint Operations Command Center, and among high-level units in various theater commands. The entire process takes at least six years or more. Therefore, it is definitely impossible to quickly fill a large number of full general-level vacancies caused by the purge in a short period of time unless Xi was to rapidly promote officers without regard to their actual capabilities.
The second issue relates to the political circumstances which could be more difficult. It suggests that Xi does not trust many of the current senior generals, thus in no hurry to fill the vacancies. There have been widespread speculations about the reasons for Xi’s distrust of high-ranking officers. These range from accusations on WeChat public accounts that General Miao Hua, former Director of the Political Work Department, was engaged in factionalism; to claims by Cai Xia, former Central Party School professor, stating in the US that Miao Hua and He Weidong, former Vice Chairman of the CMC secretly organized an independent division-level armed force in Langfang, Hebei, that obeyed only to the two of them; and even to power struggles between He Weidong and Zhang Youxia, the two Vice Chairmen of the CMC, etc.
Indeed, it is difficult to know the true reasons behind Xi’s distrust of senior military officers. However, from the criticisms published in the PLA Daily against the purged generals, it is clear that Xi’s distrust is extremely strong and unlikely to be resolved shortly. For example, in a PLA Daily editorial on October 18, 2025, it stated “as senior cadres of the Party and the military, they betrayed their original aspiration and mission and lost their Party principles. Their faith collapsed and their loyalty has gone. They have gravely failed the trust of the Party Central and the CMC, seriously undermined the principle of Party control over the gun and the responsibility system under the CMC chairman, severely damaged the political circumstance of the military forces, and strikingly impacted the political and ideological foundation of unity and progress among all officers and soldiers, causing huge harm to the Party, to national defense and military building up, and to the image of senior cadres.” The accusations of disloyalty and seriously undermining Party control and CMC system are extremely severe.
Since the problem is so serious and its impact so deep, Xi Jinping, as the supreme political and military leader, naturally has to make significant effort to what he sees as political rectification. The communiqué of the Fifth Session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, held on January 14, 2026, emphasized “strictly exercise political discipline and discipline regarding leadership transitions, resolutely eliminate ‘two-faced men’ who have divided loyalties and whose words and actions do not match….” On the 16th of the same month, at an expanded meeting of the CMC Discipline Inspection Committee, Zhang Shengmin—who has just been promoted from Secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Committee to CMC Vice Chairman—stated “…this year we must advance comprehensive and strict Party governance with higher standards and more concrete measures, continuously deepen political rectification, purify thinking, purify the ranks, and purify the environment to truly forge the people’s army into an even stronger force…” In other words, persistent political purges and related political education are the priorities of this year’s work.
How long will the political purge of the military last? After the CCP’s 21st National Congress in 2027, will promotions be made to fill the vacancies? Will this affect the proportion of full generals among the entire 21st Central Committee? If Xi has already lost trust in the senior military leadership, this will inevitably give him a sense of insecurity toward the military, thus prolonging the political purge—possibly even lasting beyond the Party’s 21st National Congress. Xi should know that leaving vacancies unfilled for too long is detrimental to the overall development of the military, which may prompt him to gradually fill the vacancies at the 21st Congress. Correspondingly, he may still maintain a fixed proportion of full generals within the Central Committee of the 21st Congress, since this could involve balancing different systems within the Party—unless he intends to completely change the existing balance. However, filling vacancies and granting Central Committee membership does not affect Xi’s practice for long-term political purge, because he already holds absolute power.
(Translated by Tracy Chou)
