Since his second term as US President, Donald Trump's foreign policy behavior has been as if he were two different people. Until he arrested Venezuelan President Maduro, Trump performed exceptionally well, focusing on building up U.S. strength, seizing AI business opportunities in the Middle East, and consolidating the U.S. sphere of influence, giving the impression of a strategist. However, his decision to join Israel in attacking Iran on February 28th in an attempt to overthrow the current regime revealed his reckless and rash decision-making. This is because divisions have emerged within Trump’s inner circle of decision-makers. Disagreements exist between Vice President JD Vance and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby—both known for their “America First” stance and hardline “strategy toward China”—and his son-in-law Jared Kushner and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth. Trump initially followed Vance's grand strategy, exemplified by last year's National Security Strategy (NSS) report, which focused on "America First" transactional diplomacy. However, earlier this year, he shifted his stance and adopted Hegseth and his son-in-law's suggestion to attack Iran.
In other words, overconfidence, intelligence failures, and cognitive biases led to Trump's strategic miscalculation. He mistakenly believed he could conquer Iran as easily as he had conquered Venezuela. He failed to recognize Iran’s complex geopolitical landscape, its powerful religious influence, its resilient national spirit, and its formidable drone and missile capabilities. Clearly, the United States has once again found itself mired in a quagmire akin to Afghanistan, triggering a costly war of attrition from which it cannot easily extricate itself. Trump would be wise to end this war as soon as possible; otherwise, if the conflict continues, it will cost $1 billion a day. Just one wrong move can cost you the entire game. The transition from strategic miscalculation to strategic disaster in turn will occur. Now that the “Operation Epic Fury” attack on Iran has lasted more than 50 days, the latest NBC poll shows that two-thirds of Americans disapprove of Trump’s handling of inflation and the conflict with Iran.
Undoubtedly, this war is not in the national interest of the United States. Trump's Middle East visit in May 2025 facilitated investment agreements, business deals, and defense contracts worth more than $2 trillion with Gulf states, including a $600 billion investment commitment from Saudi Arabia, a $1.2 trillion economic exchange agreement signed with Qatar, and a $200 billion business deal with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as well as a $1.4 trillion artificial intelligence and technology investment framework.
However, at this moment rich oil and LNG exporting countries such us Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar can no longer enjoy the lavish lifestyle they once did. As tensions over the conflict in Iran escalate, wealthy Asian investors are shifting their assets from Dubai to Singapore and Hong Kong. Worst of all, those major oil and natural gas exporting nations in the Middle East are now considering scaling back the level of investment in the United States they had previously committed to. They have long been major investors in Silicon Valley as well as in stocks and bonds on Wall Street. Dragged down by Trump’s actions against Iran, the oil-rich UAE recently is reported to request the possible financial assistance from the U.S. such as the bilateral currency swap, or it would be no choice but to switch to sell oil in renminbi or other currencies if they run low on dollars amid the Iran war.
Against this backdrop, the United States initiated ceasefire negotiations with Iran through the good offices of Pakistan. However, following the first round of talks, Trump once again resorted to his favored maximum pressure. On the one hand, Trump told the media that Iran had requested negotiations, while simultaneously threatening that if the two sides failed to reach an agreement, the U.S. would launch large-scale airstrikes on Iran’s bridges and electricity facilities. His aim is to force Iran to make concessions by taking advantage of creating international public opinion favorable to the US, and this also served as preparation for the U.S. to withdraw from the negotiations. Another example of this maximum pressure strategy is the U.S. military’s seizure of an Iranian cargo ship on the 19th, following reports that Iran had launched drone attacks against some U.S. warships in retaliation. It is reported that a U.S. delegation is traveling to Pakistan for a second round of talks with Iran, while Tehran has emphasized that there will be no second round of talks unless the U.S. lifts its naval blockade against Iran. Trump even mentioned that he might visit Pakistan to sign a ceasefire agreement, or he may bomb Iran’s power facilities and bridges on a large scale before simply leaving.
There are three possible scenarios for the post-war situation in the Middle East. The first scenario is that the United States suddenly withdraws. In fact, it is the United States—more so than Iran—that wishes to end the fighting. If Trump wants to prevent the Republican Party from losing in the upcoming midterm elections in November, he must first bring this war to an end as soon as possible, and only then will he be able to secure significant economic benefits from the summit to be held in Beijing in May. The current negotiations are aimed at finding a way for the United States to exit the war. At least in principle, the United States has accepted 70% to 80% of Iran’s 10 demands. Prior to the last round of talks, the United States, through the mediating country Pakistan, stated in writing that it would accept Iran’s preconditions, such as the unfreezing of Iran’s assets and the cessation of U.S. military deployments in the Middle East. However, the U.S. reneged on its word. Consequently, unless these commitments are fulfilled and the issues are clarified, Iran will not participate in the second round of negotiations. The remaining 20% is crucial, and the core issues remain unresolved. What remains are the nuclear issue and the Strait of Hormuz issue—namely, whether to allow Iran to pursue nuclear development and whether to fully open the Strait of Hormuz. It remains highly uncertain whether a second round of negotiations will take place and whether a compromise can be reached. Perhaps the two sides will pragmatically reach a win-win agreement, with the United States and Iran agreeing to a ten-year moratorium on suspension of enriched uranium production and use, and Iran agreeing to share the Strait of Hormuz passage fees with the United States on the Oman side. Another possible situation is that Iran presented nuclear dust to prove that the U.S. destroyed its enriched uranium. In this scenario, Trump could save face while reaping economic benefits, and Iran could secure tangible benefits while temporarily retaining its enriched uranium. Israel will be the loser in this case, to face a resurgent Iran alone as a result of this war—an Iran that may even supplant Sunni Saudi Arabia as the leader of the Arab Islamic world. This is why Israel has proposed that the U.S. establish military bases within its territory; naturally, the majority of Sunni Muslim nations are also wary of the rise of Shi’ism. Therefore, the UAE cannot rule out the possibility of joining the war against Iran. The meeting of Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey in Islamabad recently not only represents the greatest hope for a ceasefire with Iran, but also the prototype of a new post-war order aimed at containing the dominance of Israel and Iran. They may further strengthen military cooperation with Pakistan. This also why Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has strongly warned that the escalating war involving Iran and Israel risks plunging the region into a "wider conflict". He has condemned Israeli actions as a "genocide network", and suggested that continued provocations could force Turkey's hand, signaling a potential intervention to protect regional security. Moreover, the post-war reconstruction of the Middle East requires China's infrastructure capabilities. This will give Beijing a premium chance to expand its influence in the region in a big way.
Secondly, the United States, Israel, and moderate pro-Western Sunni countries can still maintain a united front against Iran but rather a weaker one. A third possible outcome is the collapse of Iran (refugees scattering to other Gulf states, even allowing the radical ISIS to resurge) or the formation of a warlord-dominated situation. This would be the worst scenario to end the war.
