（Adjunct Distinguished Professor of Diplomacy and Director, Center for WTO Studies College of International Affairs National Chengchi University To-hai Liou）
Trapped by the conflict in Iran and facing the looming November midterm elections, U.S. President Trump—whose approval rating has hit an all-time low of 33 percent—finds himself in a tight spot and is desperate to turn the tide. Consequently, he has come up with a sudden idea: a “North Korea card” strategy against South Korea that kills two birds with one stone. He is attempting to pressure South Korea’s Lee Jae-myung administration to accelerate investment in the United States to secure economic benefits, while simultaneously reaping substantial political gains from North Korea’s Kim Jong-un. This plan may seem like a pipe dream, but it is not entirely impossible.
In fact, Trump had long harbored resentment over South Korea’s willingness to provide only US$350 billion in investment—an amount he felt fall short of the US$500 billion minimum he had expected, matching the figures from Taiwan and Japan. Compounding the situation was the protracted conflict with Iran, which was costing the U.S. nearly US$1 billion daily and creating an urgent need for funds; consequently, Trump abruptly ordered the Pentagon to drastically scale back upcoming joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises. He criticized South Korea for refusing to join U.S. efforts to denuclearize Iran, while simultaneously noting that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un had remained "non-threatening" and "very respectful" toward him throughout his presidency. Clearly, he was incensed by Lee Jae-myung’s lack of cooperation, implying that Lee—unlike Kim Jong Un—showed him no respect.
North Korea has consistently opposed US-South Korea military exercises, invariably condemning them in harsh terms. As a result, Trump’s decision to scale back the latest drills—a move that also served to assert his authority over South Korea—is viewed as a gesture of goodwill toward the North. Shortly after the announcement, there is a report indicating that Trump has privately urged his aides to arrange a meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un as early as this November. Just imagine: if Trump were to make an unprecedented visit to Pyongyang, he would likely receive the same grand welcome previously accorded to Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Such a visit would not only allow him to shake off the gloom surrounding the Iran crisis, but—more importantly—it could lead to a dramatic, spur-of-the-moment announcement establishing formal diplomatic relations between the US and North Korea. Were that to happen, he could return home claiming a massive diplomatic triumph; after all, since World War II—with the brief exception of the Korean War incursion—the US has never maintained formal diplomatic ties with the northern half of the Korean Peninsula. Trump would thus achieve a feat no predecessor had managed, extending American influence into North Korea for the first time. He could then boldly frame the move to the American public as a countermeasure against China, effectively projecting the US-China rivalry right up to the Sino-North Korean border—Beijing’s most sensitive frontier. In particular, should Xi Jinping’s visit to the US in September fail to yield the substantial economic benefits Trump desires, he might well pursue this course of action, thereby garnering significant support from American voters.
Kim would naturally welcome such a visit, provided Trump refrains from insisting on North Korea's denuclearization; Kim’s historic mission is to establish diplomatic relations with the United States and Japan, thereby restoring balance to the Korean Peninsula—moving beyond a status quo where only South Korea maintains formal ties with the four surrounding major powers—and ultimately achieving the goal of transforming North Korea into a "normal state."
Naturally, Xi Jinping could not simply turn a blind eye to the flirtatious overtures and clandestine exchanges between the U.S. and North Korea; he had long since made preparations. His visit to Pyongyang in June this year—following the May summit with Trump in Beijing—likely served a dual purpose: conveying the details of the Xi-Trump meeting while simultaneously consolidating strategic cooperation among the three land-based powers (China, Russia, and North Korea). This move also involved identifying Japan as a common adversary of the three authoritarian states—evidenced by Kim Yo-jong’s recent scathing criticism of Japan’s resurgent militarism and Putin’s assertion of sovereignty during a visit to Iturup Island (known as Etorofu in Japan), one of the four islands in the disputed Kuril chain claimed by both Russia and Japan. Furthermore, Xi might invite Kim Jong-un to attend the APEC summit in Shenzhen this November as a special guest of the host nation. Such a strategy allows China to steer the situation to its advantage, helping Kim Jong-un step onto the international stage and move toward becoming a "normal state," thereby shifting North Korea's focus away from security concerns alone and toward domestic economic development. Indeed, reports suggest that during Xi’s visit, China and North Korea reached a consensus on economic and trade cooperation regarding the Tumen River outlet—a project for which China and Russia had already agreed to collaborate, pending North Korea's approval. Subsequently, Wang Huning, current Communist Party of China's Politburo Standing Committee member—often referred to as the "strategist for three administrations"—visited Pyongyang in the mid July, likely to discuss the specific details of this cooperation.
South Korea is particularly concerned that, during his visit to North Korea, Xi Jinping did not reiterate China's long-standing principle of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula; this raises the possibility that Trump and Xi reached a consensus in Beijing to shift the focus of future policy regarding North Korea's nuclear arsenal toward arms control and management. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is currently visiting Seoul, and it is possible that he will facilitate an inter-Korean summit in China in the near future, or perhaps arrange for a summit to take place alongside the APEC summit in Shenzhen—or even a five-party summit involving China, the US, Russia, North Korea, and South Korea, excluding Japan. With regard to Trump’s North Korea card, the Lee Jae-myung administration is pleased to see US-North Korea détente and the 4th summit, in an expectation that Trump could play a peace maker on the Korean peninsula politics.
